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Abstract
A brief review is given of the minority game, an idealized model of a market of
speculative agents, and its complex many-body behaviour. Particular consideration
is given to the consequences and implications of correlations between stategies and
different frequencies and timings of adaptation.
There is currently much interest in the statistical physics community in the
emergence of complex co-operative behaviour as a consequence of frustration
and disorder in systems of simple microscopic constituents and rules of in-
teraction. Examples are found in spin and structural glasses, neural networks
and hard optimization problems [1]. Minimal models, designed to capture the
essence of real world problems without the latter’s peripheral complications or
to go beyond them to provide solubility and conceptual insight, have played
crucial roles in the understanding of such systems, via their computer simu-
lation, mean field analyses and extrapolation. The minority game is a corre-
sponding minimalist econophysics model introduced to mimic a simple market
of speculators trying to profit by buying low and selling high. In this paper
we review some of its features and consider it in the context of complexity.
The model comprises an ensemble of a large number N of agents each of whom
at each step of a discrete dynamics makes a choice which has a scalar value
that can be either positive or negative (buy or sell). The objective of each agent
is to make a choice of opposite sign from that of the sum of all the actions.
No agent has any direct knowledge of the actions or propensities of the others
but is aware of the cumulative action (sum of the choices). Each agent’s actual
choice is determined by the application of a personal strategy operator to some
common information available identically to all. In the simplest versions of the
model, to which we restrict here, the strategy operators are chosen randomly
and independently for each agent before play commences and are not modified
during play. Each agent does however have a finite set of strategies, which
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for simplicity we restrict to two each. At each step one strategy is chosen.
The choice is determined by points allocated to each strategy and augmented
regularly according to a comparison between the behaviour its play would
have yielded and the actual outcome; the points are increased for minority
prediction. This is the only mechanism for co-operation but is sufficient to
yield complex macroscopic behaviour. As we shall see this complex behaviour
has both similarities and differences as compared to condensed matter systems
studied earlier.
In the original version of the model [2] the information on which decisions were
made was the history of the actual play over a finite window (e.g. the last m
steps). However, simulations demonstrated that utilising instead a random
fictitous ‘history’ at each time-step produced essentially identical behaviour,
suggesting that its relevance is just to provide a mechanism for interaction [3].
Effective interaction via the common information is demonstrated by a devi-
ation of the macroscopic behaviour from that of agents making independent
random choices at each time-step. Phase transitions occur as a function of
scaled information dimension d = D/N , where D is the unscaled information
dimension [4], and also as a function of ‘temperature’ T in the case of stochas-
tic indeterminacy in strategy choice [5,6]. These manifest in singularities in
macroscopic measures, such as the fraction of frozen agents [7] and appropriate
response functions [8]. Complexity arises in that a critical phase line in (d, T )
space separates a region in which the starting point allocations are irrelevant,
after an ‘equilibration’ period, from one in which different starting extremes
yield different behaviours; we refer to these situations respectively as ergodic
and non-ergodic. The non-ergodic behaviour manifests in the volatility being
sensitive to initial conditions, reminiscent of the differences between field-
cooled and zero-field-cooled linear susceptibilities in a spin glass [1]. While
the volatility remains finite for all (d, T ), a divergence does occur in an appro-
priate response function [8], reminiscent of that in the spin-glass or third-order
non-linear susceptibilities in a spin glass.
Since the information on which the agents act is the same for all, this problem
is manifestly mean-field. It therefore offers the potential for exact solution
for its macro-behaviour in the sense of the elimination of the microscopic
variables in favour of self-consistently determined macro-parameters in the
thermodynamic limit. The actual solution of these self-consistency equations
is, however, non-trivial in general, and not all scenarios have yet been fully
explored.
In this paper we restrict discussion to systems with the ‘information’ (on which
the strategies operate to yield choices) chosen randomly at each time-step.
However we consider several variations on further convention, in particular
with respect to independence of strategies and frequency or timing of the up-
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dating of strategy points. These variations have demonstrated several novelties
some of whose investigation has thrown new light on the underlying behaviour
and others which require further study.
The physics seems robust to variations of detail concerning the use of contin-
uous or discrete ‘bid’ or strategy spaces, nor on the number of strategies each
agent holds provided it is finite. However, for completeness we indicate the ver-
sions used in the figures. At the basic level each agent i, i = 1, . . . , N , is taken
to have two D = dN -dimensional strategies Ria = (R
1
ia, . . . , R
dN
ia ), a = ±1,
with each component Rµia chosen independently randomly ±1 at the outset
and thereafter fixed. µ(t) is chosen stochastically randomly at each time-step
t from the set µ(t) ∈ {1, . . . , D} and each agent plays one of his or her two
strategies R
µ(t)
ia , a = ±1. The actual choices of a used, bi(t), are determined
by the current values of point differences pi(t). Here we restrict to determin-
istic choices, bi(t) = sgn(pi(t)), but a simple extension to stochastic choices is
possible [5,6,9]. The pi(t) are updated every M time-steps according to
pi(t+M) = pi(t)−M
−1
t+M−1∑
ℓ=t
ξ
µ(ℓ)
i

N
−1/2
∑
j
(ω
µ(ℓ)
j + ξ
µ(ℓ)
j sgn(pj(t)))

 , (1)
where ωi = (Ri1 + Ri2)/2, ξi = (Ri1 − Ri2)/2. The case where M = 1 is
referred to as the online model. For M ≥ O(N) one expects (and simulations
confirm) the behaviour to be the same as that for the so-called batch version
in which the sum on the actual µ(ℓ) in (1) is replaced by an average:
pi(t+ 1) = pi(t)− λN
−1
D∑
µ=1
ξµi


∑
j
(ωµj + ξ
µ
j sgn(pj(t)))

 , λ = O(1). (2)
It is of interest to compare the cases of differently correlated Ri1,2 [10]. In
Fig. 1 are shown the volatilities obtained in simulations with strategies cho-
sen randomly with correlation probability P (Rµi1 = R
µ
i2) = ρ, ρ ∈ [0, 0.5],
for both the on-line and the batch models. For the uncorrelated case the on-
line and batch models are almost identical, both exhibiting a minimum in
volatility lower than the random-bid value at a critical d [4,11], but as the
level of (anti-)correlation is increased the volatilities of the online and batch
models become increasingly different from one another, as well as different
from the uncorrelated situation. Earlier studies on systems with uncorrelated
strategies showed slight differences between online and batch models both in
simulations [12] and theoretical studies [13] but anti-correlation as studied
here significantly amplifies and highlights the differences.
In the thermodynamic limit (N →∞) the macrodynamics of the batch prob-
lem for arbitrarily correlated local strategies Ri1,2 can be expressed in terms
3
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Fig. 1. Volatilities with varying degrees of anticorrelation between pairs of strategies,
P (Rµi1 = R
µ
i2) ≡ ρ = 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, top to bottom, (a) online, (b) batch.
of non-linear coupled equations involving two-time correlation and response
functions, via an extension of the generating functional method of Heimel
and Coolen [8]. The full equations are complicated but can be conveniently
expressed via a self-consistently determined coloured effective single-particle
noise [8,14]. Here we just give some results. Let us concentrate first on the case
of independent Ri1,2. In this case the volatility exhibits a minimum at a critical
dc above which the dynamics is ergodic and beneath which it is non-ergodic,
the volatility yielded by a tabula rasa point initiation, pi(0) = 0, being greater
than that for a strongly biased start |pi(0)| ∼ O(1). For d ≥ dc a simple ansatz
provides the stationary limit in accord with simulations [11]. For d < dc the
behaviour is non-ergodic and a full closed analytic solution is still awaited, but
iteration of the coupled macrodynamical equations is possible numerically us-
ing the self-consistent noise-sampling procedure of Eissfeller and Opper [15].
This shows good accord with corresponding simulations, as is illustrated in
Fig. 2a. An analagous treatment of the anti-correlated case demonstrates that
the non-ergodic transition persists, even though the volatility itself appears
smooth; see Fig. 2b. The existence of a phase transition separating ergodic
and non-ergodic regions is reminiscent of transitions between equilibrating
and non-equilibrating regions in the ‘condensed matter’ examples mentioned
earlier. The existence of a critical dimension Dc scaling as N is reminiscent
of the critical scaling limit on the number of retrievable stored patterns in a
neural network [16], but there are also crucial differences [17,10].
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Fig. 2. Comparison of volatilities for tabula rasa and strongly biased-point starts in
batch minority games after 40 time-steps (pi(0) = 0.0 (circles), 0.5 (squares) and
1.0 (diamonds) for normalisation λ = (1 − ρ)−1). (a) Uncorrelated strategies. (b)
Fully anti-correlated case. Open symbols denote simulations for N = 1000 players.
Solid symbols represent results from a numerical evaluation of the macroscopic
self-consistent equations derived analytically in the limit N → ∞. An average is
performed over 50000 realisations of the single-particle noise.
For M ≥ O(N) the temporal correlation functions
C(τ) = lim
t→∞
N−1
∑
i
sgn(pi(t + τ))sgn(pi(t)) (3)
exhibit oscillations with period 2M . In the ergodic region these oscillations die
away with a finite decay time for ρ > 0. In the non-ergodic region oscillatory
behaviour persists. Randomizing the precise time of updating, independently
for each agent, but maintaining the average updating frequency, reduces and
eventually (if the time-spread is sufficient) removes the oscillations. This does
not have an obvious well-known spin glass analogue and suggests a different
complexity.
The minority game was already recognized as having interesting features from
the perspective of complex emergent behaviour in many body physics, includ-
ing an ergodic-nonergodic phase transition. By considering correlated strate-
gies we have re-iterated that anti-correlation increases volatility and have
demonstrated that it amplifies differences between online and batch behaviour,
implying that updating frequency is relevant in generalizations of online learn-
ing models. We have also shown that analytic theory of the batch model can
be extended to correlated strategies and is in good accord with simulations
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for both ergodic and non-ergodic regions. An ergodic-nonergodic transition is
found in the fully anti-correlated case even though the tabula rasa volatility
is smooth.
A more complete description of our results and analysis will be presented
elsewhere [14].
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